April 29, 2026 US confirmed
U.S.: the return of negotiated remedies — the FTC accepts a behavioral remedy in Omnicom/Interpublic
The policy shift changing the U.S. antitrust risk calculus. Under the second Trump administration, the FTC and DOJ have revived negotiated remedies as a merger-resolution path, in contrast to the pure-litigation strategy of the Biden administration's final years. In Q1 2026, the agencies secured three consent settlements, creating a more deal-friendly environment. The declared preference is for structural remedies (divestitures), but the FTC accepted a behavioral remedy in Omnicom/Interpublic Group: it bars the merged company from directing advertising away from media based on political or ideological viewpoints. A deal abandonment was also recorded (Alcon/Lensar). For merger arbitrage, the message is clear: a problematic deal now has a higher probability of closing with remedies than of being blocked.
January 1, 2026 GB confirmed
UK: the CMA shifts to a deal-friendly approach with the DMCC Act, after years of divergence with the EU
The case proving why a multi-jurisdiction tracker matters: the same deal can proceed in one forum and be blocked in another. The pivotal moment was 2023, when the UK CMA blocked Microsoft's acquisition of Activision Blizzard —in direct contrast to the European Commission, which cleared it with behavioral remedies. Since then, with the Digital Markets, Competition and Consumers Act (DMCC Act) in force since January 1, 2025, it introduced a hybrid jurisdictional threshold and a 'Strategic Market Status' (SMS) regime, aligned with the DMA but with more flexibility. After the February 2025 consultation, the CMA signaled a deal-friendly shift with its '4Ps' framework, aiming to cut pre-notification from 65 to 40 working days.
January 15, 2026 MX confirmed
Mexico: reform eliminates the constitutional autonomy of the competition authority (formerly COFECE)
The institutional change altering the regulatory risk of any deal with a Mexican nexus. A constitutional 'organic simplification' reform eliminated seven autonomous constitutional bodies, including the Federal Economic Competition Commission (COFECE) and the Federal Telecommunications Institute, consolidating their functions within the Executive. Although justified on budgetary-efficiency grounds, it has raised critical questions about the independence and technical scope of competition in Mexico. For M&A analysis, the predictability and technical independence of merger review are in question. The two readings —budgetary efficiency versus loss of independence— are attributed to their proponents, with the tracker adopting neither.
January 22, 2026 EU confirmed
The pending 2026 megadeals: Alphabet/Wiz and Anglo American/Teck under Brussels' scrutiny
The future decisions merger arbitrage is already pricing in. In early 2026, the European Commission is scheduled to decide on Alphabet's acquisition of cybersecurity firm Wiz and Anglo American's combination with Teck. Scrutiny persists over 'killer acquisitions', and with several member states adopting powers to review below-threshold deals —and the Commission's willingness to accept Art. 22 EUMR referrals— there is material investigation risk. The number of mergers notified in 2025 remained stable (384, versus 392 in 2024). These pending deals are the catalysts to watch: their outcome will set precedent for the tech and industrial sectors.
April 29, 2026 EU confirmed
EU: the Commission keeps a low intervention pace and reviews its merger guidelines
The state of European enforcement, key to the timing of any transatlantic deal. The European Commission concluded only one significant merger investigation in Q1 2026 —a Phase II clearance with remedies—, confirming the low-intervention trend. The average duration of Phase II cases stood at 14.1 months. In 2025 it adopted only two Phase II decisions (Liberty Media/Dorna Sports and Mars/Kellanova), both unconditional, and closed the year with three Phase II proceedings ongoing. It also launched the consultation to revise its Merger Guidelines, with adoption planned for Q4 2027. For arbitrage, the EU remains conservative on remedies but intervenes little: the risk lies more in prolonged timing than in a block.
December 24, 2025 EU confirmed
Booking/eTraveli: the EU's only prohibition of a tech merger and the 'killer acquisitions' debate
The datum recalibrating how much the EU actually blocks in tech. As of May 2025, the European Commission had evaluated 22 mergers of major tech firms acquiring control of other companies —six by Google, two each by Apple, Meta and Amazon, and ten by Microsoft— and none was prohibited; in two cases the parties withdrew after the statement of objections (Amazon/iRobot and Microsoft/Time Warner/Contentguard). The only prohibition was Booking/eTraveli (M.10615): the Commission vetoed the dominant hotel-booking platform acquiring a flight-booking one. The 'killer acquisitions' debate persists. For arbitrage, the EU rarely prohibits in tech, preferring remedies or prompting withdrawals; outright prohibition is the exception.
March 30, 2026 BR confirmed
Brazil: CADE speeds reviews and expands digital enforcement
The Latin American jurisdiction gaining the most relevance for regional M&A. As his term closed in March 2026, outgoing CADE president Gustavo de Lima left Brazil's competition authority with a stronger record on settlements and a marked expansion in unilateral-conduct and digital-markets enforcement, keeping review times low despite a high caseload. CADE is Brazil's sole merger-control authority. The Superintendence has shown willingness to recommend blocks (Fagron/Purifarma, May 2025) and to dismiss deals for false information (Clickbus/RJ Participações, February 2026). For regional arbitrage, Brazil combines speed with growing appetite for digital markets.
January 16, 2025 EU confirmed
Illumina/GRAIL: the record €432 million gun-jumping fine and its later annulment after the ECJ ruling
The case defining the procedural risk of closing before clearance. Under its 2021 referral policy, the Commission began to 'call in' transactions acquiring companies with competitive potential even if they generated little turnover. On that basis it prohibited Illumina's acquisition of GRAIL in 2022, despite it not being notifiable in any member state. It also imposed a record €432 million fine for closing during review ('gun-jumping', Art. 7(1) EUMR). The outcome shows risk in both directions: after the ECJ's 2024 ruling on Art. 22, the Commission withdrew its referral guidelines, the block decision and the gun-jumping decision. Jurisdiction over below-threshold deals has judicial limits.
November 30, 2025 EU confirmed
National vetoes and 'golden power': when the member state blocks what competition law would clear
The risk layer pure competition analysis misses: the national strategic-political veto. Beyond competition merger control, member states' foreign direct investment (FDI) regimes and special powers add an independent blocking path. FDI screening outcomes are mostly permissive (86% unconditional, 9% conditional, 1% prohibitions, 4% withdrawals), but interventions can be far-reaching. Spain's prohibition of Ganz-Mavag's takeover of Talgo is the benchmark intra-EU example. In 2025, Italy's 'golden power' regime imposed extensive conditions on UniCredit's €10 billion bid for Banco BPM, prompting withdrawal; in November 2025 the Commission warned Italy it encroached on the ECB's remit. A deal can pass the competition test and still fall to a national veto.
