Profile of each 2026 election's digital safeguards and risks: whether the country regulates political advertising on platforms, whether that advertising is transparent and traceable in an ad library, what framework applies against disinformation, and what verified digital risks (spyware, internet shutdowns) shape the environment. It does not measure who wins nor judge candidates; it measures the gap between holding an election and holding it with digital integrity. Each record cross-references the election with applicable regulatory frameworks and with Diálogo Ciudadano's other trackers.
Statistical readings derived from the attributes of each recorded case. All figures come from the documented events; amounts are computed only over cases with a sum expressed in the indicated currency, without converting between currencies.
Choropleth by number of forensically or judicially documented cases. Countries with no verifiable public cases remain in the base colour — the absence of events does not equal the absence of surveillance. Hover or click a coloured country to see the cases.
Not all 2026 elections are held with the same digital safeguards. In the EU, political advertising is traceable by law in an ad library; in the United States, transparency depends on the platforms' goodwill. This profile measures that gap: the distance between holding an election and holding it with digital integrity.
When we talk about an election's integrity, the conversation usually stops at the vote count. But much of the battle is fought earlier, in the digital layer: in who can pay for political advertising and whether that advertising is visible, in what framework protects against disinformation, and in whether the environment is contaminated by surveillance or internet shutdowns. This profile measures those four dimensions for the 2026 elections, one per country.
The sharpest contrast is regulatory. The European Union countries voting in 2026 —Malta, Sweden, Latvia, Hungary— apply the political-ad transparency Regulation and the Digital Services Act, which mandate a queryable ad library. The United States, by contrast, has no equivalent federal law: the transparency of digital political advertising depends on the voluntary libraries the platforms choose to maintain. Two democracies, two levels of safeguard.
Of the elections profiled, only around a third have transparent, mandatory political advertising in an ad library —almost all in the EU—. In the rest, the traceability of digital political spending depends on the platforms' goodwill or does not exist.
Hungary's case illustrates why regulation alone does not guarantee integrity. As an EU state, Hungary applies the world's most demanding political-ad transparency framework. And yet, on its territory Pegasus use against journalists was confirmed, and the EU monitors it over the rule of law. Having the best advertising law does not prevent the digital environment from being degraded by surveillance.
That is why the profile cross-references the regulatory dimension with the verified digital risk from Diálogo Ciudadano's other trackers. An election can have perfectly transparent political advertising and, at the same time, spied-on journalists or internet shutdowns in opposition areas. Both things count, and that is why they are measured separately. An election's digital integrity is not a single number: it is a multi-dimensional profile whose dimensions rarely all point the same way.
For its 2026 elections, Zambia shows this digital-integrity profile: political-ad regulation 'Parcial', ad transparency 'Voluntaria', disinformation framework nacional limitado. Partial regulation; the EU was invited as observer. Past internet shutdowns during campaigns.
For its 2026 elections, Estados Unidos shows this digital-integrity profile: political-ad regulation 'No (federal)', ad transparency 'Voluntaria — Ad Library plataformas', disinformation framework sin marco federal. No federal digital political-ad law; transparency depends on platforms' voluntary libraries. Generative AI in campaigns, Section 230 debate.
For its 2026 elections, Suecia shows this digital-integrity profile: political-ad regulation 'Sí (UE)', ad transparency 'Sí — DSA Ad Library', disinformation framework del DSA. Applies the EU framework; the country braces for possible cyberattacks on the electoral process.
For its 2026 elections, Rusia shows this digital-integrity profile: political-ad regulation 'Estatal restrictivo', ad transparency 'No', disinformation framework censura estatal. State control of the information space; no political-ad transparency and documented digital censorship.
For its 2026 elections, Nueva Zelanda shows this digital-integrity profile: political-ad regulation 'Sí', ad transparency 'Voluntaria — Ad Library plataformas', disinformation framework nacional. Regulates electoral advertising; a benchmark in content moderation after the Christchurch attack.
For its 2026 elections, Malta shows this digital-integrity profile: political-ad regulation 'Sí (UE)', ad transparency 'Sí — DSA Ad Library', disinformation framework del DSA. As an EU state, it applies the political-ad transparency Regulation and the DSA, with a mandatory ad library.
For its 2026 elections, Marruecos shows this digital-integrity profile: political-ad regulation 'No', ad transparency 'No', disinformation framework sin marco. No political-ad transparency framework; history of digital surveillance and press pressure.
For its 2026 elections, Letonia shows this digital-integrity profile: political-ad regulation 'Sí (UE)', ad transparency 'Sí — DSA Ad Library', disinformation framework del DSA. Applies the EU framework; focus on electoral cybersecurity given its border with Russia.
For its 2026 elections, Israel shows this digital-integrity profile: political-ad regulation 'Parcial', ad transparency 'Voluntaria — Ad Library plataformas', disinformation framework nacional limitado. Partial regulation of political advertising; home of NSO Group and surveillance under scrutiny in the electoral period.
For its 2026 elections, Hungría shows this digital-integrity profile: political-ad regulation 'Sí (UE)', ad transparency 'Sí — DSA Ad Library', disinformation framework del DSA. Applies the EU framework, but with confirmed Pegasus use against journalists and under EU rule-of-law monitoring.
For its 2026 elections, Etiopía shows this digital-integrity profile: political-ad regulation 'No', ad transparency 'No', disinformation framework sin marco. No political-ad transparency framework; history of internet shutdowns during periods of tension.
For its 2026 elections, Colombia shows this digital-integrity profile: political-ad regulation 'Parcial', ad transparency 'Parcial — Ad Library plataformas', disinformation framework nacional + plataformas. The CNE partially regulates; transparency depends on platforms' voluntary libraries. Pegasus purchase under investigation.
For its 2026 elections, Brasil shows this digital-integrity profile: political-ad regulation 'Sí (TSE)', ad transparency 'Sí — Ad Library + reglas TSE', disinformation framework del TSE + STF. The Superior Electoral Court regulates advertising and disinformation; intense platform-liability litigation after the June 2025 STF decision.
One 2026 national election per country is recorded and four digital-integrity dimensions are noted: (1) whether political advertising on platforms is regulated; (2) whether that advertising is transparent in a queryable ad library; (3) what disinformation framework applies; (4) what verified digital risk exists (cross-referenced with Diálogo Ciudadano's spyware and shutdown trackers). Each dimension is attributed to its source —the regulatory framework, the platform or the corresponding tracker—. The absence of a risk flag means the absence of a public verified case, not the absence of risk. Results are not predicted.